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What is Falun Gong?
Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is an ancient Chi-
nese meditation practice, or gigong, which seeks to nurture
the mind and body through the mixture of Buddhist beliefs,
slow movements, and martial-art-type exercises, while empha-
sizing the fundamental principles of “truth, benevolence,
and forbearance.” Literally, “Falun Gong” means “Cultivation
of the Wheel of Law,” while “Falun Dafa” translates to “Great
Wheel of Buddha’s Law.” 
Falun Gong was intro-
duced in China in 1992 by Li
Hongzhi, one of many gigong
masters who sought to gain
followers by promoting his
own variety of gigong. Li’s
quick success resulted in
Falun Gong’s transformation
into an international phe-
nomenon, attracting millions
of people in over forty coun-
tries. Such widespread popu-
larity has generated concern
within the Chinese govern-
ment. Fearing the potential
influence such a popular
movement could have within
China, the Chinese govern-
ment has characterized Falun
Gong as an evil cult and has
carried out an extensive cam-
paign to eliminate the
group’s presence from Chinese society. 
The Chinese Campaign against Falun Gong
The first major conflict between the Chinese government
and Falun Gong occurred on April 25, 1999, when over
10,000 Falun Gong followers orchestrated a peaceful demon-
stration surrounding Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership
compound in Beijing. The protest was carried out in response
to reports of violence by Chinese officials against Falun Gong
practitioners, and as an objection to the government’s pro-
scription of Falun Gong publications. The demonstration was
nonviolent; the New York Times reported that protestors
remained “motionless, calm and seated on the sidewalk.”
The Chinese government was nonetheless concerned with the
magnitude of the apparently benign demonstration. Some
have compared it to the 1989 student-led protests in Tianan-
men Square. Nevertheless, the resolution to this initial con-
frontation was diplomatic: several Falun Gong followers dis-
cussed their grievances with government officials at the scene,
and the protesters retreated in peace.
Perhaps fearing the potential strength of the group, by late
July 1999 the Chinese government responded with a massive
crackdown on Falun Gong. The Chinese government cur-
rently utilizes legal institutions to carry out the crackdown.
Specifically, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs and Public Secu-
rity censors Falun Gong activities; the National People’s Con-
gress has established crimes and penalties for the continued
practice and advocacy of Falun Gong; and the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court prosecutes and punishes Falun Gong practi-
tioners. Additionally, the official Chinese media facilitates the
government’s propaganda campaign against Falun Gong by
characterizing Falun Gong as a “dangerous ‘evil sect’.” 
The State Council’s Censorship of Falun Gong
In April 1999 the State Council Ministries of Civil Affairs
and Public Security officially banned the practice and pro-
motion of Falun Gong. The ban was carried out through the
confiscation and public destruction of millions of Falun
Gong books, tapes, and other materials, and by blocking
access to all Internet websites related to Falun Gong. The ban
also prohibited assembly of Falun Gong practitioners. The
censorship efforts extended
beyond the territorial limits of
China: two government-funded
Chinese academic institutions
hacked into Canadian Internet
service providers that hosted
Falun Gong websites.
Detention, Prosecution, and
Reeducation of Falun Gong 
Practitioners
The government’s eradica-
tion campaign also led to the
detention of thousands of Falun
Gong practitioners. Ye Xiaowen,
Director-General of China’s
State Administration of Reli-
gious Affairs, reportedly told
China’s official Xinhua News
Agency that by August 2000, 151
Falun Gong practitioners were
convicted for using Falun Gong
to create social chaos or “other
crimes,” and had received criminal penalties, including
prison sentences. In her article, “Falun Gong: An Analysis of
China’s National Security Concerns,” published in the March
2001 issue of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, Kelly
Thomas cites reports from Amnesty International stating
that as of early 2001, over 600 Falun Gong followers were
forcibly committed to mental hospitals, 10,000 were sent for
“re-education through labor without trial,” and 50,000 Falun
Gong followers were held against their will in temporary
detention centers, where they reportedly risk torture and even
death. In “Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political Abuses,”
published in the Spring 2000 issue of the Columbia Journal of
Asian Law, Robin Munro, Senior Research Fellow at the Law
Department and Center of Chinese Studies at the University
of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, described
the conditions often faced by Falun Gong practitioners
forced into mental hospitals: “[p]eople are drugged with
various unknown kinds of medication, tied with ropes to
hospital beds . . . subjected to electro-convulsive therapy or
painful forms of electrical acupuncture treatment, denied ade-
quate food and water . . . forced to write confessional state-
ments renouncing their belief in Falun Gong as a precon-
dition of their eventual release, and then required to pay fines
. . . for their board and treatment in the hospital.”  
Forced “Re-education” of Falun Gong Practitioners 
China’s Xinhua News Agency reported that the Chinese
government claims it has prosecuted only a minority of Falun
Gong practitioners. According to a senior official of Chinese
religious affairs, the vast majority of those prosecuted
China’s Crackdown on Falun Gong  
by Erin Chlopak*
A visiting scholar at George Washington University, originally
from the Yun Nan Province of China, practices Falun Gong at a











continued on next page
1
Chlopak: China's Crackdown on Falun Gong
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001
18
“ . . . have been converted to normal life after persuasion and
education for over a year.” While China claims its re-education
of Falun Gong practictioners is successful, the re-education
component of China’s anti-Falun Gong campaign may be its
least effective. Re-education is pursued through the detention
of practitioners, who are forcibly enrolled in classes that
teach the government’s anti-Falun Gong philosophy. Some
who have completed the program report that at the conclu-
sion of the re-education session, detainees are forced to sign
a statement promising not to continue practicing Falun
Gong, and another statement asserting that Falun Gong is an
evil cult. Despite these apparent conversions, however, not
all detainees who complete the re-education process actually
renounce their commitment to Falun Gong. 
Violent Repression of Falun Gong Practitioners
Violence is integral to China’s campaign against Falun
Gong and, as one government official commented, “practi-
tioners who are not beaten generally do not abandon the
group.” The Washington Post and
Amnesty International noted that
in 2001 the central Chinese lead-
ership—for the first time in its
effort to purge China of Falun
Gong—officially sanctioned the sys-
tematic use of violence against the
group’s practitioners. The Wash-
ington Post further reported that,
according to government sources
and Falun Gong practitioners, Chi-
nese officials employ a variety of violent practices, such as beat-
ing detainees and shocking them with electric truncheons.
Officials also torture detainees with “unbearable physical
pressure.” For instance, detainees are forced to squat on the
floor for days at a time. In addition, Amnesty International
has documented the use of electric shock batons to beat
practitioners, and a device called the “Di Lao,” in which a vic-
tim’s wrists and feet are “shackled and linked together with
crossed steel chains making it nearly impossible to walk or sit
down.”
The Chinese Media’s Propaganda Campaign against Falun Gong
While the government’s campaign of violence endeavors
to abolish the practice of and belief in Falun Gong, the pro-
paganda campaign has been effective in gaining public sup-
port. The most common and seemingly most effective element
of the propaganda campaign is recurrent broadcasting and
reporting of the self-immolation of several alleged Falun
Gong practitioners in Tiananmen Square in January 2001. By
repeatedly depicting images of a young girl burning alive while
asserting that Falun Gong preaches that such self-immolation
will lead its followers to paradise, the Chinese government
reportedly has succeeded in persuading many people that
Falun Gong is an “evil cult.” In response to the self-immola-
tions, several unnamed Falun Gong spokespersons attempted
to disassociate the movement from such events, expressing
skepticism about whether those who set themselves on fire
actually were Falun Gong members.
Consequences of China’s Crackdown on Falun Gong
Perhaps the most disturbing element of China’s cam-
paign against Falun Gong is reports of its fatal consequences
in some cases of detained practitioners. In a recent briefing
on human rights conditions in China, Amnesty International
noted that since the group was banned in July 1999, over 250
Falun Gong practitioners have died while in official custody.
According to Amnesty International, many of these deaths
resulted from torture and ill treatment while in government
custody. The Chinese government officially reports these
deaths as suicides. Reported attempts by Chinese officials to
conceal or destroy evidence by hastily cremating the victims
before relatives could see the bodies or before autopsies
could be performed compound the suspicion surrounding
these deaths.    
International Legal Consequences of China’s Actions against
the Falun Gong
China’s crackdown on Falun Gong demonstrates a dis-
turbing irony. In spite of the country’s long-standing record
of deficient human rights practices, the Chinese govern-
ment seemingly desires to improve its reputation, as sug-
gested by its ratification of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), one of the
more progressive international
human rights treaties. Addition-
ally, in November 2000 China’s
Vice Foreign Minister Wang
Guangya and UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights Mary
Robinson signed a memorandum
asserting the Chinese goal of har-
monizing its domestic laws with its
international commitments. Chi-
na’s treatment of Falun Gong prac-
titioners blatantly violates these obligations.
In addition to its obligations under the ICESCR, China has
expressed its intention to abide by broader international
human rights principles through membership in the United
Nations and by ratifying and/or signing other international
treaties. As Kelly Thomas argued in Falun Gong: An Analysis
of China’s National Security Concerns, China’s membership in the
UN constitutes a pledge by the Chinese government to pro-
mote the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). Similarly, as a signatory to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 1997,
China acknowledges its duty to protect the rights enunciated
in the treaty. 
China’s Acknowledgment of Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Principles
As a member of the United Nations, China is bound to
promote respect for the rights and freedoms enumerated
in the UDHR, and, as the Declaration states in its preamble,
to “[s]ecure their universal and effective recognition and
observance . . . among the peoples of Member States them-
selves.” The various articles of the UDHR proclaim, inter alia,
the universal right of “everyone” to be free from torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment-
(Article 5); the right to receive equal protection against dis-
crimination (Article 7); the right to be treated without
distinction on the basis of, inter alia, religion or political or
other opinion (Article 2); the right to be granted a “fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,
in the determination of [one’s] rights and obligations and
of any criminal charge against [a person] (Article 10);
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“freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” and the free-
dom to “manifest [one’s] religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance” (Article 18); and freedom
of opinion and expression, including the right to “hold
opinions without interference” (Article 19). China’s treat-
ment of Falun Gong practitioners, and of the practice of
Falun Gong throughout China, stands in marked contrast
to its acceptance of such principles. In fact, in August 1999
the UN denounced China’s treatment of Falun Gong,
declaring that the banning of the group, the destruction of
its materials, the detention of its practitioners, and the pre-
vention of their free assembly violates the “spirit and pro-
visions” of international human rights instruments.
China’s Commitments under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
Many of the principles expressed in the UDHR are codi-
fied in the ICCPR, which China signed in 1998, but has yet
to ratify. In particular, the ICCPR proscribes the subjection
of any person to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment (Article 7), and to
arbitrary arrest or detention (Arti-
cle 9(1)). The ICCPR further pro-
nounces the right of everyone to
freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion, including the right
to manifest one’s beliefs, and the
right to be free from coercion (Arti-
cle 18). In spite of China’s failure
to ratify the ICCPR, its signature of
the treaty indicates the government’s recognition of the sig-
nificance of the principles the ICCPR codifies. Moreover,
China did not enter any reservations when it signed the
ICCPR, nor has it made any relevant statements. China’s
aggressive actions against the Falun Gong constitute blatant
contradictions of ICCPR principles, and shed doubt on the
government’s professed commitment to improving its human
rights record.
China’s Obligations under the Convention Against Torture
China’s obligation to refrain from sanctioning or per-
mitting torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment is explicit and solidified by
China’s ratification in October 1988 of the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). The CAT defines torture as any act
“by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or men-
tal, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining . . . information or a confession, punish[ment], or
. . . intimidat[ion]” (Article 1 (1)). The state-sanctioned
methods of inflicting physical suffering and forced “reedu-
cation” to compel Falun Gong practitioners to renounce
their beliefs and commitments exemplifies the definition of
torture. China’s only reservations regarding the CAT relate
to the authority of the Committee against Torture and the
International Court of Justice to investigate and arbitrate,
respectively, alleged violations.
China’s National Security Defense
To justify the government’s abusive tactics, the Chinese
media characterizes Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi as
“anti-China” and accuses the group of conspiring to over-
throw the Chinese government. In July 2000, the official Xin-
hua News Agency described Falun Gong as “an evil force
which is anti-science, anti-humanity, anti-society and anar-
chistic,” as well as “a trouble-making group that attempts to
challenge the [Communist] Party and the government.”
More recently, in January 2001 the Agency cited reports
from China’s widely read newspaper, People’s Daily, which sug-
gested that Falun Gong sought to “topple” the leadership
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
and the Chinese government.  
Even if Falun Gong did present a legitimate threat to Chi-
nese security—a claim that seems to lack credibility—the
particular human rights principles enshrined in the UDHR,
ICCPR, and the CAT are internationally recognized as non-
derogable. Specifically, although international law recog-
nizes the right of states to derogate from some of their inter-
national obligations in times of public emergency or when
the security of the state may be in jeopardy, the fundamen-
tal human rights, which China continues to violate in its
campaign against Falun Gong, are not among those from
which states may derogate. In particular, Article 4 of the
ICCPR permits State Parties to derogate from their obligations
under the treaty in public emergencies, as required by “the
exigencies of the situation,” but excludes, inter alia, Arti-
cles 7 and 18, which proscribe tor-
ture, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, and protect
freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, respectively. Simi-
larly, Article 2(2) of the CAT pro-
claims, “[n]o exceptional circum-
stances whatsoever, whether a state
of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification of torture.” China’s
ostensible security concerns fail to
justify the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners.
Conclusion
China’s abusive tactics toward Falun Gong contradict the
government’s apparent objective of improving its histori-
cally problematic human rights record. Moreover, the devel-
opment of the conflict between the Chinese government
and Falun Gong demonstrates that abusing human rights as
a means to repress internal opposition not only violates a vari-
ety of international human rights principles, but is an inef-
fective means of achieving such repression. As China’s treat-
ment of Falun Gong demonstrates, excessive forms of
repression often unify and empower those that the govern-
ment seeks to repress, rather than facilitating their defeat. 
Ironically, the conflict between the Chinese government
and Falun Gong is largely the government’s own creation.
Before China took action, Falun Gong was simply a form of
meditation that gained popularity for its promotion of spir-
itual and physical cultivation. In July 1999, responding to Chi-
na’s initial crackdown, Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi
released a statement in which he explained that Falun Gong
is nothing more than a popular gigong activity, which lacks any
organizational structure or political objective. The Chinese
government’s repressive efforts present a paradox: the cam-
paign to eliminate Falun Gong has transformed the benign
form of meditation into a powerful, international move-
ment, backed by the fundamental support of its believers and
the encouragement of human rights and political activists
throughout the world. 
* Erin Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law
and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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